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Abstract
We consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a
drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The
low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent
Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country
chooses whether to allow parallel imports (PI) of on-patent drugs or
market based discrimination (MBD). We show that, for a moderately
high imitation cost, both (Strict IPR, PI) and (Weak IPR, MBD) emerge
as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) policy choices. For
relatively smaller imitation costs, (Weak IPR, MBD) is the unique SPNE
policy choice. The welfare properties reveal that although innovation may
be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI) policy regime, the market coverage and
national welfare of the low-income country, and the total welfare are all
lower. This opens up the eﬃciency issue of implementing TRIPS and at
the same time allowing international exhaustion of patent rights.
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1 Introduction
The implementation of the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS) agreement by developing countries, particularly for the pharmaceutical
products, has often been linked to developed countries prohibiting parallel
imports (henceforth, PI). This paper considers a policy game between a low-
income and a high-income country over patent protection and international
exhaustion of patent rights (or PI) of an on-patent drug. The equilibrium
government policies and their welfare properties, along with their implications
for the level of innovation of the drug are analyzed.
Compliance with TRIPS, which requires prohibition of imitation of patented
drugs, is meant to accelerate drug innovation to benefit developing and
developed countries alike. However, developing countries argue that TRIPS
implementation will lead to closing down of business for a significantly large
number of their firms1 and loss of market access for poor patients as a
consequence of monopoly pricing of drugs by the patent-holder multinational
corporations (MNCs).
Interestingly, the possibility of cross-country price discrimination by patent-
holder MNCs under TRIPS has raised similar concerns of accessibility to new
drugs for the poor in the rich world as well. These concerns have been addressed
in the Article Six of TRIPS, whereby countries can allow PI of an on-patent
drug from the low-priced low-income countries without the permission of the
patent-holder MNC.2 A conflict of interest among poor patients and innovator,
however, has led to a wide variation in the national rules for exhaustion among
the rich drug-importing and drug-exporting countries [Maskus (2001)]. For the
developing world, on the other hand, whereas a product patent regime may deny
market access for the poor, the situation is apprehended to be worsened further
by PI allowed by the rich countries to ensure market access for the poor in
their own countries. The reason is simple. Parallel imports of on-patent drugs
from low-income countries will lead to convergence of country-specific prices of
drugs and thus the poor (as well as the rich) in the low-income countries will be
worse-oﬀ.3 At the extreme, the MNC may not cater to the poor countries at all
1The available evidence does not seem to suggest that TRIPS will have any significant
positive impact on innovation in the developing world [Primo Braga (1990)]. Costs of full
development of a commercial drug are very high. Also, most of the developing countries,
except for countries like India, lack the technological capability to undertake basic R&D
[Chadha (2008), Lall (2003) and, Ramani and Maria (2005)].
2Under such a provision, when applied, the exclusive right to sell and distribute a patented
drug by a patent-holder MNC exhausts after the drug is being marketed, and any trader
reselling the drug needs no permission from the patent holder. This parallel trade in
original patented drug is altogether diﬀerent from imitation of the patented drug which is
the production and sale of drugs closely similar to the patented drug without the permission
of the patent holder.
3The general theoretical consensus is that price convergence makes the richer countries
unambiguously better oﬀ but the poorer countries unambiguously worse-oﬀ [Danzon (1998),
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[Malueg and Schwartz (1994)]. In addition, since PI adversely aﬀects innovation
as shown by Valletti (2006) of late, there is a conflict between implementing
strict IPR and allowing PI in terms of generating incentives for innovation.
Therefore, what appears is that benefits of TRIPS — both product patent and
flexible clauses and exceptions like PI — are neither unequivocal nor uniform
across nations.
The relevant issue that crops up in these perspectives is whether the conflict
of interest in co-implementing these two policies can be resolved in terms of
national welfare levels that incorporate the eﬀects of these policies on both
market access for poorer buyers and the incentives to innovate. This is the policy
issue that we are primarily concerned with in this paper. More precisely, we
evaluate strict and weak IPR regimes in the developing world and the alternative
rules of exhaustion in the rich countries in terms of national welfare levels.
Our welfare analysis is motivated by the recognition in Article 7 of TRIPS
that the protection and enforcement of TRIPS should be ”conducive to social
and economic welfare”. Of course, commitment of WTO member countries to
implement TRIPS has left them with no option to exercise such a choice any
longer. However, there are certain flexibility and exceptions within the scope
of TRIPS that allow country-specific variations in the implementation of an
IPR regime [Abbott (2001), Correa (2000a)]. The exception that is particularly
relevant for the developing countries and provides us with another motivation
for considering a policy choice regarding the IPR regime is compulsory licensing
(hereafter, CL). Using CL, a non-patentee can obtain license and compete with
the patent-holder by paying a nominal (or often non-existent) royalty to the
patent-holder through the national government. In essence, a CL is similar in
eﬀect to the threat of imitation as it lowers the price of drugs in the developing
countries through price competition. However, we do not confine ourselves to
the case of CL, but put our concern in a more broader policy perspective of
weak IPR protection.
In the literature on imitation and innovation, two recent papers have some
relevance for our analysis. First, Kovac and Zigic (2007) examine the optimal
trade policy choice when a quality-leader developed-country firm faces the threat
of imitation from a follower developing-country firm in a vertically diﬀerentiated
developing country market. They argue that an optimal tariﬀ imposed by
the developing country government encourages imitation, and when marginal
eﬃciencies of firms’ investment in qualities is small, it can even lead to quality
reversals (or leapfrogging). However, when quality reversals do not occur, the
tariﬀ policy lowers welfare below the free trade level. The other analysis is that
of Sohn (2007) that argues that by welfare criterion, imitation may be weakly
regulated. The investment to innovate shrinks when the innovator faces the
threat of imitation by his rival, but there is also the benefit arising from cost
reduction through imitation. Thus, although imitation weakens the incentive
for (cost-reducing) innovation, it can benefit the society on the whole. This
result has some direct relevance in the present context. However, none of these
Maskus (2001) and Richardson (2002)].
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papers have put their analyses in the specific context of pharmaceutical industry
or products that are subject to PI.
The existing literature on PI, innovation and welfare, on the other hand, has
evolved under the implicit assumption of strict IPR regime across the globe.
Thus, the impact of the threat of imitation on the choice of rich countries over
allowing PI or not has not been addressed. Valetti (2006), however, has some
relevance for the issues that we address here. Using the assumption of partial
coverage of markets, he considers the impact of PI on innovation. As the profit
of the MNC is lower under uniform pricing, PI or international exhaustion of
patent rights ex ante lowers the level of innovation of a new drug.4 ,5
To best of our knowledge, the only paper that links these two literatures
and provides a benchmark for the present paper is that of Ichino (2004). He
considers a policy game between a low-income country choosing over allowing
or not allowing piracy and a high-income country choosing over allowing or not
allowing PI. In such a context, the possibility of piracy significantly alters the
welfare eﬀect of PI. Whereas piracy is a dominant strategy for the low-income
country, the choice of PI by the high-income country depends on the population
density in the low-income country and the diﬀerence in the highest income
parameter across countries. Although Ichino draws his motivation from PI of
Japanese pop music compact disks sold by the Japanese firms in China, Hong
Kong and Taiwan, his analysis is also relevant in the context of IPR protection
in pharmaceutical markets.
However, Ichino’s analysis is deficient in one important respect. By assuming
exogenously given quality level of the IPR protected product, he neglects the
adverse eﬀect of both PI and piracy (or imitation) on the quality of the product.
But, given the adverse innovation eﬀect of PI on innovation, the incentive for
poorer countries to allow imitation when the rich country allows PI may be
smaller since those who buy the innovated drug are strictly worse oﬀ. Our
paper takes account of the adverse innovation eﬀects of PI and imitation (or
weak IPR regime).
There are other dimensions in which the present analysis diﬀers from
that of Ichino (2004). First, observing the price-setting power of the Indian
pharmaceutical firms even for the imitated drugs, we assume a single potential
imitator instead of perfectly competitive imitators.6 Second, we consider a
4This analysis has been extended to all equilibrium market-coverage combinations
(including full coverage of all country-markets) by Acharyya (2008a). It has been established
that the global welfare under PI is lower than that under market based discrimination when
the markets are partially covered. On the other hand, under full market coverage, the global
welfare under PI increases only when the market sizes (or intra-country demand dispersions)
are suﬃciently small.
5Li and Maskus (2006) are also concerned with the interaction of incentives to innovate
and PI. They design a model of process innovation in which the innovator decides whether
or not to supply their good via a distributor to another country, the distributor may in turn
decide to compete with the innovator firm in its own domestic market if PI is allowed. The
paper analyzes the impact of banning PI on the decisions of the firms. In their model, the
government in the non innovator country is not policy active.
6Even under the Patent Act 1970 that allowed imitation, reverse engineering and patents
for new processes in India until it was being replaced by the Patent Act 1999, the imitating
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leader-follower structure in the innovation-imitation subgame similar to Kovac
and Zigic (2007). However, we do not allow quality reversal through imitation
as there is no such evidence even for Indian pharmaceutical firms who have
the technical and manpower skills. That is, we assume that pharmaceutical
industries in diﬀerent countries diﬀer in their ability to produce innovative drugs.
Third, we assume that the imitator must incur in a fixed cost so as to be able
to imitate. Once this has been paid, the imitator can produce a quality level
anywhere below that of the innovation. This opens up a wider strategy set for
the innovator as we define below.
The structure of the model is as follows. We characterize the two-country
global economy, a high-income country (H) and a low-income country (L). Both
countries haveboth intra and cross country income disparity. There is a non-
empty interval of consumers in each country, the location of each consumer in
an interval being determined by income level. A key assumption is that the
intervals are not too far apart and that the richest consumer in H is richer
than the richest consumer in L. The utility of the representative consumer is
increasing in the quality level of the drug and decreasing in its price. The
firm in country H is assumed to have the technology to innovate a new drug
while the firm in country L only has the technology to produce an imitation.
Whether or not the L-firm is allowed to produce an imitation is determined by
whether the L-government enforces a weak-IPR regime (imitation allowed) or
strict-IPR regime (imitation not allowed). The sequence of events in the policy
game played by the governments is as follows. First, national governments
simultaneously choose their policy regimes. For H, where the innovator firm is
based (the higher income country), the policy choice consists of allowing PI or
letting the firm implement market based price discrimination (hereafter, MBD).
For L, where only imitation is possible, the policy choice consists of allowing
imitation (weak IPR) or not (strict IPR). Second, the H-firm determines the
quality of the innovation. Under a weak IPR regime in the low-income country,
this innovating firm decides upon whether to accommodate or deter entry of
the potential local imitator in L. If it decides to deter entry, it innovates a
limit quality.7 Third, the L-firm determines the quality of the imitation (if
accommodated). Fourth, the innovator and imitator set their prices. Finally,
the consumers in each country decide whether to buy the drug and, if relevant,
which one to buy.
Within this framework, we obtain the following results. First, for moderately
high fixed costs of imitation in the sense defined later, we have multiple sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium (henceforth, SPNE) policy pair: (Weak IPR,
MBD) and (Strict IPR, PI). Second, for relatively lower fixed cost (Weak IPR,
MBD) emerges as the unique SPNE. Thus, at a SPNE, regardless of the level
firms could enjoy positive supernormal profits. One reason for this may be the fixed costs
involved in imitation and reverse engineering which restricted entry.
7 In the literature on strategic competition between firms in a vertically diﬀerentiated
market, firms are usually assumed to commit on their quality levels first and then compete in
prices. See Shaked and Sutton (1982) for example. Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) and Lutz
(1997), on the other hand, consider limit qualities set by incumbent firms to deter entry.
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of fixed cost of imitation, entry deterring strategy and limit quality are never
realized because the low-income country never implements a weak IPR when
the innovator is expected to deter entry. Third, the welfare properties of the
two SPNE reveal that although innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR,
PI)-SPNE than at the (Weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE regime depending on the cross-
country income disparity, the market coverage and national welfare of the low-
income country and the total welfare all are lower. This opens up the eﬃciency
issue of implementing TRIPS (or strict IPR) and at the same time allowing
international exhaustion of patent rights since the optimal response of high
income countries (where MNC are based) to TRIPS implementation would be
to allow PI.
The nature of SPNE policy choices, multiple or unique, provides a theoretical
support for the historically observed policy choices in the developed and
developing countries. A SPNE policy choice (multiple or unique) always involves
a weak IPR implemented by the low-income country. The result also provides an
explanation for the interests of the rich countries in enforcing product patents
and at the same time allowing international or regional exhaustion of patent
rights. The potential threat of imitation induces the high-income country not
to allow international exhaustion of patents (and thus not to allow PI), because
the full potential benefits from PI cannot be realized. But, when the threat of
imitation is eliminated through implementation of a strict (and uniform) IPR
regime across the globe under the WTO commitments, the potential benefits
from PI can be fully realized and this is more desirable than MBD for the rich
country.
One of the possible SPNE we obtain here that involves the rich country
allowing PI and the low-income country respecting TRIPS could be related to
results obtained Grossman and Lai (2008). They analyze countries with diﬀerent
abilities to innovate (North and South) choosing policies on price caps and PI.
They conclude that a North country might use PI as a means to discourage price
caps in the South country. Similarly, the choice to give patent protection will
have an impact on the ability of the innovator to set high prices in the South
country.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic
assumptions and structure of our analytical framework. The firm strategies and
innovation choices are derived in section 3. Section 4 examines the SPNE policy
choices. Section 5 discusses the properties of the two SPNE policy choices, and
re examine the policy choices considering compulsory licensing allowed by the
low-income country and the possiblity of transport costs. Finally, concluding
remarks are made in section 6.
8Grossman and Lai (2008) use a general equilibrium dynamic model of innovation where
new varieties are introduced. Their model shares some similarities with ours. We also allow
the North to prohibit PI. However, the choice on the side on the poor country is whether or
not to abide by TRIPS agreement to give patent protection to the North firm. Such choice will
indeed have an impact on the ability of the innovator firm to set high prices in the Southern
country, similarly to price caps being set.
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2 The analytical framework
Let us consider a two-country world, we refer to these two countries as rich
or high-income country (H) and a poor or low-income country (L). These
countries diﬀer in a number of ways. First, although we assume that personal
income is uniformly distributed in each country j (j = H,L) between y
j
and
yj
³
yj > yj
´
, we also assume that both the richest and poorest consumer in
country H have a higher level of income than those in country L, i.e., yH > yL
and y
H
> y
L
. This reflects the existence of income inequality both within and
across countries. A consumer in country-j with income y buys, if at all, only one
unit of the drug. The potential buyers in country-j are distributed uniformly
over the relevant income range [y
j
, yj ] with unit density for each income level.
Thus,
h
yj − yj
i
is the extent of (intra-country) demand dispersion. As we will
see, as long as y
j
is suﬃciently small relative to yj so that it pays for a patent-
holder MNC to only partially cover both these markets, these assumptions really
do not matter for our results. All that matters is that the richest buyers in the
H-country are richer than the richest buyers in the L-country (i.e., yH > yL),
but at the same time they are not too rich in the sense yH < 3yL. Of course, the
extent of market coverage should be endogenously determined as we elaborate
below and can indeed influence the policy choices, but we will confine ourselves
in this paper with partial coverage of both markets. The reason for this is that
the increased market access argument for imitation and PI makes sense when
initially the markets are not fully covered.
The second way in which our two countries diﬀer is the ability of
their pharmaceutical industry to perform basic R&D research. There is a
pharmaceutical firm located in the H-country which develops a new drug with
quality s∗ > 0. Innovation requires investment of a sum of money C in R&D
that increases at an increasing rate with the target level of innovation:
C =
1
2
(s∗)2 (1)
We also have a pharmaceutical firm in country L, but this firm is unable
to improve on the quality produced by the innovator firm. However, once the
imitation technology has been acquired at a cost F , this firm can produce a
drug of any quality s < s∗. To simplify the analysis, we assume there are no
production and distribution costs whatsoever for any of the two firms.
Finally, the diﬀerences in the pharmaceutical industries result in diﬀerences
in the policies available for implementation in each of the two countries.
Whereas an IPR regime is strictly enforced and monitored in the H-country,
the L-country government may choose to implement a weak IPR regime, which
would allow imitation. On the other hand, the H-country must choose whether
or not to allow PI of the drug innovated by its own firm and sold in the L-country.
If PI are not allowed, the innovator firm will be able to price discriminate across
countries.
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Though every consumer values a higher quality drug more than a lower
quality drug, these valuations vary across consumers with diﬀerent incomes.
More precisely, following the literature on quality choice we assume that
richer buyers attach an even higher valuation to a better quality drug relative
to a lower quality drug than do the poorer buyers. This means that the
marginal willingness-to-pay for quality varies across diﬀerent income levels in
each country.9 We assume that such a preference relationship is linear in income
and quality so that if a consumer purchases a drug of quality s∗, she gets a gross
utility of
Vj(y, s∗) = ys∗ ∀ y ∈ [yj , yj ], j = L,H. (2)
Since each buyer buys only one unit of the drug, the net utility, assumed to be
additively separable, equals,
vj(y, s∗, Pj) = ys∗ − P ∗j , (3)
where P ∗j is the price of the s
∗ quality drug charged in country-j.
We consider the following timing for the decisions taken by the agents
in our model, first, welfare maximizing governments in countries H and L
simultaneously choose whether or not to allow PI and whether or not to
implement strict IPR respectively. Second, the firm in the H-country decides
the quality of the drug. Third, the firm in the L-country chooses the quality of
the imitated drug, thereafter, the innovator and the imitator simultaneously set
their prices. Finally, the consumers in each country decide whether to buy the
drug, and in if relevant which one to buy.
In what follows, we obtain the innovation, price and national welfare levels
under each of the four possible combination of policy regimes: strict-IPR regime
in both countries with and without PI allowed by the H-country, and a weak-
IPR regime in L-country with and without PI allowed by the H-country. Finally,
we will discuss SPNE strategy choices for the governments.
Using backwards induction, we start with the decisions faced by consumers in
each country. First, note that, regardless of whether the H-country government
allows PI or not, consumers there can only consume the drug innovated by
the patent protected innovator, that is, exports of the imitated drug to the
H-country are not possible. Hence, their purchase decision is determined by
the non-negative value of net-utility vH(y, s∗, P ∗H) as defined in expression (3).
However, for the consumers in L-country the choice is two-fold, if a weak IPR
regime is implemented and if the innovated drug is locally imitated. First
is whether to participate in the market, and second is which drug, original
innovated one or the locally imitated one, to buy. These decisions are dictated
by the following individually rational (IR) and self-selection (SS) or incentive-
compatible constraints respectively:
9Here, we follow the specification used in our earlier analyses [Acharyya and García-
Alonso (2006, 2008)]. Gabszweicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) relate
the diﬀerences in marginal willingness-to-pay for quality to diﬀerences income levels. Mussa
and Rosen (1978) however link them to taste diversity.
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vL(y, s, P ) = ys− P ≥ 0, (4)
vL(y, s∗, P ∗L) ≥ vL(y, s, P ) =⇒ ys∗ − P ∗L ≥ ys− P, (5)
where, P is the price of the locally imitated and produced drug and P ∗L is the
price charged by the innovator in the L-country. Of course, the SS constraint
is relevant only if the imitator firm enters. A strict IPR regime will prevent
imitation. In addition, given our assumption of fixed costs of acquiring an
imitation technology, the innovator might choose to deter entry. In both these
cases, only the IR constraint that ensures the non-negative value of net-utility
vL(y, s∗, P ∗L) will matter.
We must also restrict the choice set for innovated quality to (0, 1) such that
the profit maximizing quality s∗ < 1. This will ensure that whenever the IR
constraint is satisfied (4), the budget constraint P ≤ y is satisfied as well.10
In the section that follows, we will analyze the firms profit maximizing choices
given the diﬀerent policy scenarios, Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium prices
and quality levels for each case.
3 Firm strategies under alternative policy
regimes
3.1 Strict IPR and market based price discrimination
Let P ∗jD and s
∗
D denote the price in country-j market and the innovated quality
under MBD respectively. Let y∗jD be the marginal consumer in country-j market
who derives zero net benefit from the price, quality menu (P ∗jD, s
∗
D) oﬀered by
the MNC to the potential buyers there. Using the IR constraint, we obtain the
marginal (and indiﬀerent) consumer’s income level
y∗jD =
P ∗jD
s∗D
. (6)
Consumers with higher income will buy the drug as for them the IR constraint
is also satisfied. Thus, if y
j
< y∗jD, the buyers with smaller income than y
∗
jD do
not buy the drug and the country-j market is partially covered. On the other
hand, if y
j
> y∗jD, all buyers in country-j buy the drug, and the markets are fully
covered. Thus, in case of partial market coverage, given the uniform and unit
distribution, the total demand for the drug in country-j market is
£
yj − y∗jD
¤
.
Hence, the profit of the MNC equals,
10 In the literature on quality choice, it is generally assumed that a small proportion of income
is spent on the quality diﬀerentiated good so that the purchasing power constraint is implicitly
assumed to be non-binding (see Tirole (1992)). But, our linearization of marginal willingness-
to-pay in (2) does not allow us to assume a non-binding purchasing power constraint. However,
instead of considering a separate purchasing power constraint, we set s∗ < 1 , as suggested
by an anonymous referee, so that the IR constraint (2) implies the purchasing constraint. See
Acharyya (2005, 2008b) for an explicit purchasing power constraint and how such a constraint
by itself provides a scope to a monopolist to discriminate.
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π∗D =
X
j=L,H
"
P ∗jDyj −
P ∗2jD
s∗D
#
− 1
2
s∗2D . (7)
For any innovation level, profit maximization yields the following
discriminatory prices in the two markets:
P ∗jD =
1
2
s∗Dyj , j = L,H. (8)
Substitution of (8) in (6) yields,
y∗jD =
1
2
yj . (9)
The following lemma specifies the parametric configurations underlying
diﬀerent combinations of the extent of market coverage at equilibrium under
MBD.
Lemma 1 Under MBD, when the L-country implements a strict IPR regime,
the MNC covers
i) each country market partially for all y
j
< 12yj , j = H,L
ii) country-i market fully but country-j market partially for all y
i
> 12yi and
y
j
< 12yj , i 6= j = H,L, yH ∈
£
1
2yL,
1
2yH
¤
.
iii) both markets fully for all y
j
> 12yj , j = H,L.
All these claims follow from the profit-maximizing choice of the extent of
market coverage as specified in (9). From now, we will assume that the intra-
country income disparity is suﬃciently large in the sense that y
j
< 12yj ,
j = H,L. Hence, at equilibrium both country markets are only partially served,
because otherwise the often quoted market-access argument in favour of a weak
IPR regime in the L-country does not make sense ex ante.
It is now straightforward to obtain the profit maximizing quality level:
s∗D =
1
4
£
y2L + y
2
H
¤
, (10)
3.2 Weak IPR and market based price discrimination
Under a weak IPR regime in the L-country, a local producer learns about the
production technology by investing a sum F and chooses an inferior quality of
the drug, esD ∈ [0, es∗D), where es∗D denotes the quality of the drug innovated by
the MNC under the threat of imitation. We will observe that the lower price
of the imitated drug, eP , compared to that charged by the MNC, eP ∗LD induces
some of the low-income buyers, who would otherwise buy the original drug, to
switch to the imitated drug. This, in turn, forces the MNC to lower the price
of the innovated drug. Alternatively, the MNC may deter entry by setting a
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limit quality, provided that it is profitable to do so. As we will see later, such a
decision to deter entry depends on the level of fixed cost.
We start with the case when the imitator enters and the innovator MNC
accommodates entry, given the IR and SS constraints, defined in (4) and (5),
the market demand in the L-country for the imitated and innovated varieties
is as follows. All consumers with income y ∈ [eyD, ey∗LD) buy the imitated
drug whereas all buyers with income y ≥ ey∗LD buy the original drug, whereeyD = ePDesD and ey∗LD = eP ∗LD − ePDes∗D − esD . Note that as a tie-breaking rule, we assume
that the indiﬀerent buyer with income eyD buys the original innovated drug.
Hence, assuming eyD > yL the demands in the low income country for the
imitated and innovated drugs are [ey∗LD − eyD] and [yL − ey∗LD] respectively. Profit
maximization yields the following prices and the quality level for the innovator
and imitator:
eP ∗LD = 14es∗DyL, (11)
eP ∗HD = 12es∗DyH , (12)
ePD = 1
14
es∗DyL. (13)
The above results in the following levels of innovated and imitated quality
es∗D = 148 £12y2H + 7y2L¤ , (14)
esD = 4
7
es∗D. (15)
It is easy to check that the MNC innovates a lower quality under the threat
of imitation. The reason for this is simple. The price competition from the
imitator forces the MNC to lower the price of the innovated drug and since
innovation is costly, it saves upon the innovation cost by innovating a lower
quality. However, it is easy to prove that the lower price compensates the eﬀect
of the lowered quality resulting in greater coverage of the L-country market by
the MNC, i.e., y∗LD − ey∗LD > 0. That is, the MNC now caters to an additional
(y∗LD − ey∗LD) number of poorer buyers whom it would exclude from the market
under a stronger IPR. We summarize the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 When the innovator accommodates entry under a weak IPR regime
in the L-country, the threat of imitation lowers both the innovation level and the
price, but raises the extent of market coverage at the low-end of the L-country
market compared to a stronger IPR regime.
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Note that buyers even poorer than those served by the MNC, viz., with
income y ∈ [eyD, ey∗LD) can also access the drug, albeit the inferior quality
imitated one.
The greater market coverage by the MNC is the competitive eﬀect of a weak
IPR regime. Of course, the above analysis presumes that it is worthwhile for
the lower income country firm to enter the market and imitate the innovated
drug by incurring the fixed cost. If entry occurs, the profits realized for the
innovating MNC and the imitating local firm are the following:
eπ∗D = 12 (es∗D)2 . (16)
eπD = 1
48
y2Les∗D. (17)
For the local firm entry is worthwhile only if the cost of imitation is
suﬃciently low,
F < FD = eπD. (18)
For higher fixed costs of imitation, entry is blockaded and a weak IPR regime
would not pose any threat to the innovator. When entry is blockaded, the MNC
innovates the same quality s∗D as it would under a strict IPR and prices out the
poorer buyers in the L-country market having income less than y∗LD. However,
even if entry is not blockaded it may still be profitable for the MNC strategically
deter entry. Realizing that the local imitator’s potential profit (obtained in
(17)) varies directly with the innovated quality es∗D, the MNC can innovate a
lower limit quality es∗Dl which, for any given F , deters entry by pushing the net
potential profit for the local imitator to zero. From (18), using (17), such a limit
quality equals,
es∗Dl = 48y2LF. (19)
Since in our assumed timing of decisions, the quality levels are committed
(sequentially) by the innovator and the imitator before the prices are chosen, by
innovating this entry-deterring limit quality the MNC can charge the monopoly
prices in the two markets in the same way as it would under a stronger IPR
regime, i.e., eP ljD = 12es∗Dlyj , j = H,L. Two observations are in order, which we
state in the lemma that follows.
Lemma 3 Under a [weak IPR,MBD] policy regime, if the innovator chooses to
deter entry, it innovates a lower quality and charges a lower price. The quality
and price declines are proportional such that the L-country market is covered to
the same extent as under a strict IPR regime.
Proof. See appendix
Note that, given Lemmas 2 and 3, under a [weak IPR,MBD] policy regime,
market coverage in the L-country is less when the entry is deterred than
when it is accommodated. This brings out the essential diﬀerence between
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the entry-accommodating and the entry-deterring strategies. Under the entry-
accommodating strategy, the MNC responds to the weak IPR regime by
innovating a smaller quality but by lowering (the post entry duopoly) price
more than proportionately so that it actually covers a greater fraction of the
L-country market. On the other hand, under the entry-deterring strategy, by
committing to an even lower quality, despite lowering the (monopoly) price
proportionately and thus serving the same number of buyers in the L-country
as under a stronger IPR regime, the MNC squeezes the potential price-cost
margin for the imitator suﬃciently to make entry unprofitable for any fixed cost
of imitation.
All these discussions are, however, relevant only if it is worthwhile for the
MNC to deter entry. The following lemma proves that this will not be the case
under the present policy regime.
Lemma 4 Under a [weak IPR,MBD] policy regime, the innovator will always
accommodate entry. On the other hand, entry is blockaded if F > FD.
Proof. See appendix.
That is, if it is worthwhile for the local imitator to enter, the MNC always
accommodates. Essentially, we show that entry deterrence is only worthwhile
for too high a fixed cost, but, for that fixed cost the local imitator itself chooses
not to enter (i.e., entry is blockaded).
3.3 Strict IPR and parallel imports
Suppose the H-country allows PI of the drug from the L-country. Arbitrage then
forces the MNC to charge a uniform price P ∗p across countries. Let y∗p denote
the marginal consumers in each country market who derive zero net benefit from
the menu (P ∗p , s∗p) oﬀered by the MNC to all potential buyers:
y∗p =
P ∗p
s∗p
.
As already discussed, if y < y∗p , both markets are partially covered. In that
case, the profit of the MNC equals,
π∗p = P
∗
p [yH + yL]−
2
¡
P ∗p
¢2
s∗p
− 1
2
s∗2p . (20)
Proceeding as before, the profit-maximizing uniform price, for any given
choice of innovation, equals:
P ∗p =
1
4
[yH + yL] s
∗
p. (21)
Resulting in indiﬀerent consumer at
y∗p =
1
4
[yH + yL] . (22)
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Note that by our earlier assumption that y
L
< 12yL, the MNC serves both
markets partially under PI, provided, of course, the L-country market is served
at all, which requires that 3yL > yH . In rest of our analysis, we will assume
that the cross-country income disparity is not too large so that under PI the
MNC serves both countries.
Under these assumptions, the innovation level is:
s∗p =
1
8
[yH + yL]
2 , (23)
Note that s∗p < s∗D, which is the under-investment result of Valletti (2006):
PI lower the innovation level.11
3.4 Weak IPR and parallel imports
Finally, we consider the case where the L-country does not enforce a strict IPR
regime and the H-country allows PI of the original drug from the L-country.
Let eP ∗p and ePp be the prices of the original and imitated drug, and es∗p be the
level of quality of the innovated drug when entry is accommodated. Proceeding
as before, it is straightforward to check that, when entry is accommodated,
consumers in the H and L-country having at least income levels ey∗Hp = eP ∗pes∗p and
ey∗Lp = eP ∗p − ePpes∗p − esp respectively purchase the innovation. The imitated drug, on
the other hand, is bought by the consumers in the L-country having at least the
income level eyp = ePpesp (lower than ey∗Lp). Given this, the entry accommodating
profit-maximizing innovated and imitated quality level equal
es∗p = 796 (yH + yL)2 , (24)
esp = 8
11
es∗p. (25)
resulting in profit level for the innovator
eπ∗p = 12 ¡es∗p¢2 . (26)
Note, that once again, the level of innovation is smaller than that under a
strict IPR regime (with PI), es∗p < s∗p. On the other hand, the local imitator
enters the market for all F < F p, where F p is such that
11This result has been generalized in Acharyya (2008) for all possible parametric
configuration — very large, moderately large, small and very small intra-country demand
dispersions — resulting in unilateral and universal partial and full market coverages as
equilibrium outcomes.
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F p = eπp = 7
4 (48)2
(yH + yL)
4 (27)
under an entry-deterring strategy the MNC innovates the limit quality es∗pl such
that eπp − F = 0:
es∗pl = 96
(yH + yL)
2F. (28)
Lemma 5 Under a [weak IPR,PI] policy regime, the MNC deters entry by
setting a limit quality es∗pl specified in (28) for all F ∈ ¡F ∗p,root, F p¤ . On the
other hand, entry is blockaded if F > F p, and accommodated if F < F ∗p,root,
where
F ∗p,root =
"
12−
√
95
4 (48)
2
#
(yH + yL)
4 . (29)
Proof. See appendix.
Once again, imitation by a local firm lowers the profit of the MNC. However,
there is one essential diﬀerence. Under MBD, although the MNC was forced to
compete with the local imitator in the L-country, it could still charge monopoly
price in its own country. Now, under PI, a uniform price must be charged in
both the markets. Thus, the prospect of imitation lowers the MNC’s profit
in both markets. Setting the limit quality to deter entry would enable the
MNC to charge the (non-discriminatory, uniform) monopoly price. At the same
time, there are profit losses from setting the lower limit quality. This is due
to the smaller market coverage compared to that under entry accommodation
because the price in the L-country is raised more than proportionately. Since the
magnitude of this loss varies inversely with the level of limit quality and hence
with the value of F . For suﬃciently large values of F , profit gains outweigh
profit losses and thus entry deterrence becomes relatively profitable.
4 Policy choices
We now consider the SPNE policy choices. Each government maximizes national
welfare, which is simply the sum of the domestic consumers surplus and the
profit of its native firm. For the L country, the imitator’s profit (net of the
fixed imitation cost) matters only when a weak IPR is implemented there and
entry is accommodated by the drug innovator. Otherwise, national welfare in
country L is simply the domestic consumers surplus, for any given price-quality
menu chosen by the innovator. For example, the national welfare levels in
countries L and H when a weak IPR is implemented in the L-country and entry
is accommodated by the drug innovator are (other welfare levels can be similarly
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defined)
fWLD = hyDZ
hy∗LD
³esDy − ePD´ dy + yLZ
hyD
³es∗Dy − eP ∗D´ dy + eπD − F, (30)
fWHD = yHZ
hy∗HD
³es∗Dy − eP ∗HD´ dy + eπ∗D. (31)
As evident from the above discussions, the level of fixed cost of imitation
influences the firm strategies. The SPNE policy choices thus vary accordingly.
However, we will confine ourselves to the range of fixed costs for which entry
is not blockaded, i.e., it is worthwhile for the potential imitator to enter the
market under a weak IPR when the MNC does not deter entry. Since FD < FP
for the relevant range of incomes, it is enough to assume,
F < FD. (32)
On the other hand, although F ∗p,root < F p , F ∗p,root may be greater than FD for
some high cross-country income diﬀerences as illustrated in Figure 1.12 In that
case, given the assumption in (32), the parametric values for which F ∗p,root is
greater than FD will mean that the MNC will accommodate entry under both
MBD and PI. Thus, (as specified in the Lemma 6 below) when the levels of
highest incomes in the two countries are such that
F ∗p,root < FD, (33)
we have only two distinctly diﬀerent cases which we refer to in the Lemma
6 as Cases I and II. Otherwise, we have only one of these cases, or to be more
precise, the case which we label below as Case II. Figure 2 provides a visual
reminder of the optimal strategy of the innovator regarding entry deterrence for
the diﬀerent levels of fixed imitation costs.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Lemma 6 When the L-government implements a weak IPR regime, under the
assumptions (32)-(33), the relevant parametric configurations that lead to two
diﬀerent payoﬀ structures of the policy game are as follows. For all F such that,
Case I: FD > F > F ∗p,root. The MNC accommodates entry under MBD and
deters entry under PI . Thus, either fWjD or fWjp(espl) j = L,H, are realized
according as the policy choice of the H-country.
Case II: F ∗p,root > F > 0. The MNC accommodates entry under both MBD
and PI. The welfare levels realized are either fWjD or fWjp, j = L,H
12The diagram is drawn letting yH = tyL and then normalizing yL to unity; the relevant
range of cross-country diﬀerence is thus given by the interval [1, 3] for the parameter t.
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Proof. Follows directly from Lemmata 2-5 and the discussions above.
The two cases specified in the above lemma exhaust all the possibilities
regarding the implications of the policy game between the governments,
irrespective of how large the cross-country income diﬀerences are within the
limit for which both the markets are served by the MNC. Note that F < F ∗p,root
< FD would corresponds to Ichino’s (2004) policy game, extended to endogenous
innovation decision. Figure 3 represents the payoﬀ matrix for countries to
summarize the notation for all the possible welfare levels under Lemma 6. Table
2 provides the expressions for each of those welfare levels. By simply comparing
the diﬀerent welfare levels we immediately obtain the results that follow in the
paper.13
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Lemma 7 Under MBD, the L-country unambiguously gains from weak IPR
whereas the H-country unambiguously looses.
It is straightforward to prove that fWLD − FD > WLD . Since the net
welfare is monotonically decreasing in F and the least value in the relevant
range is fWLD − FD, then,fWLD − F > WLD ∀ F ∈ £0, FD¤ . (34)
It is also straightforward to prove that
fWHD < WHD . (35)
The gain from a weak IPR regime when entry is accommodated comes from
two sources. First, it is the greater market coverage: the MNC caters for some
poorer consumers whom it would not cater for under a stronger IPR, and the
even poorer buyers, who can still not buy the original drug, can now buy the
low-priced imitated drug. Second, it is the decline in the price of the original
drug for all other buyers, which being more than proportional to a lower quality
of the original drug, raises the net surplus for all infra-marginal buyers. This
is an interesting result which provides a theoretical justification for the poorer
countries’ reluctance to implement strict IPR regime.
However, the welfare of the H-country is strictly lower under a weak IPR
because imitation lowers profit of the MNC and also welfare of the consumers in
the H-country because of the lower innovated quality. The price decline cannot
compensate the buyers in the H-country for the lower quality as it does in the
L-country because the buyers there have a higher marginal willingness to pay
for higher quality.
Lemma 8 Under strict IPR, the L-country unambiguously gains from MBD
whereas the H-country unambiguously looses.
13The details of calculations and plotting of expressions for the diﬀerent welfare expressions,
using the whole range of relevant parameters, can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Note that the quality of the innovated drug is now lower whereas the
(uniform) price is higher than the discriminatory price charged to buyers in
the L-country. Thus, whereas some low-income buyers in the L-country are
now driven out of the market, those who still buy the drug are worse-oﬀ due
to lower innovated quality and higher price. So on all accounts the national
welfare under PI declines below that under MBD for the L-country. On
the other hand, the source of gain from PI for the H-country is the price
reduction and the consequent greater market coverage since by (9) and (22),
y∗H − y∗p =
1
4
[yH − yL] > 0. As shown in Figure 4, this is large enough to
outweigh the welfare losses arising out of lower innovation and lower profit for
its MNC. This welfare result captures the popular belief that PI benefit only
the richer countries.
We can now examine SPNE policy choices for each possible level of fixed costs
already referred to as Case I and Case II. The following proposition summarizes
our results:
Proposition 1 In the above policy game, there are two SPNE policy choices —
(Strict IPR, PI) and (weak IPR and MBD) — for high fixed costs of imitation
(Case I: FD > F > F ∗p,root) for which entry is deterred under PI when a weak
IPR regime is implemented in the L-country. For low fixed cost of imitation
(Case II: F ∗p,root > F > 0) for which entry is accommodated under PI, (weak
IPR and MBD) emerge as the unique SPNE policy choices.
First, in Case I, it can be checked that (Strict IPR, PI) is a SPNE policy
regime. To see this, first of all note from Lemma 8 that when the L-country
implements a strict IPR regime, allowing PI is the best strategy for the H-
country. On the other hand, note that fWLp(espl) is monotonically increasing
in the fixed cost of imitation (see Table 2) and is strictly less than WLp for F
close to F p. For F = F p, entry is blockaded so that essentially the weak IPR
regime with entry deterrence boils down to the strict IPR regime. But, as F
falls below F p, entry is feasible, and the MNC deters entry by the limit quality
which is strictly lower than the innovation level under strict IPR with PI. As
argued earlier in Lemma 3, it also lowers its (discriminatory) monopoly price
but only proportionately to cover the L-country market to the same extent as it
would under a stronger IPR. Thus, the market coverage under a weak IPR (with
entry deterrence) is the same as that under a stronger IPR when the H-country
allows PI. But the lower quality reduces welfare more than the lower price raises
it for the infra-marginal buyers because they have successively greater marginal
willingness-to-pay for higher qualities. That is, lower innovation hurts these
buyers more than lower price benefits them. Overall the welfare falls below
what the L-country could get under a stronger IPR. Moreover, this net welfare
loss is successively higher, the smaller is the level of fixed cost of imitation.
Hence,
fWLp(espl) < WLp ∀ F < FD. (36)
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Thus, the L-country should choose a strict IPR regime when the H-country
allows PI. This makes (Strict IPR and PI) a SPNE policy pair.
Second, still in Case I, strict IPR is not a strictly dominant strategy for
the L-country government because by Lemma 7, country L’s welfare is higher
under weak IPR when the H-country chooses MBD. In addition, it is possible
to prove that fWHD > fWHp(espl). Figure 5 illustrates how this indeed holds.14
Hence, (weak IPR and MBD) is also a SPNE in case I. This is an interesting
but not counter-intuitive result. Implementing a weak IPR is worthwhile for the
L-country when the H-country chooses MBD because entry of the local imitator
is not deterred by the MNC in this subcase. And given the potential threat
of imitation (because it is not worthwhile for the MNC to deter entry), the
H-country government realizes that the full benefits of PI cannot be obtained.
Thus, the threat of imitation induces the H-country to allow MBD which though
lowers the market coverage in the H-country, results in higher innovation and
therefore, improved health-care quality. But, if the H-country can eliminate
the threat of imitation by ensuring implementation of a stronger IPR regime,
then the full benefits of PI can be realized (despite a lower innovation level) and
allowing PI is chosen over MBD, resulting in the other SPNE. These multiple
SPNE brings out the conflicting interests of the developing and the developed
world in implementing TRIPS. The implementation of strict IPR is not a unique
optimum choice of the low-income countries. But if this is no longer a policy
choice for them as a consequence of WTO commitments, then it is in the best
interest of the richer countries like the EU and Japan to allow PI through
regional or international exhaustion of patent rights.
Now, consider Case II where entry of a local imitator under a weak IPR
regime in the L-country is always accommodated by the MNC regardless of
whether the H-country allows PI or not. First of all, note that since now the
MNC accommodates the local imitator, when the H country chooses PI, there is
scope for welfare gain for the L-country from a weak IPR. Though under a weak
IPR the MNC lowers its innovation level compared to that under a stronger IPR
(i.e., esp < sp), by Lemma 4, it covers a larger market in the L-country. The
buyers who would have purchased the drug even under a stronger IPR (i.e., those
with income y∗p and higher) would lose no doubt because their higher marginal
willingness to pay for a higher quality means that they are hurt more by the
lower innovation than they are benefitted from the price decline. But the poorer
buyers who are now served by the MNC (i.e., those with income higher than ey∗p
but lower than y∗p ) will unambiguously gain. The other two sets of agents who
gain from implementation of a weak IPR when the H-country chooses PI, are
those who buy the imitated drug and the local imitator itself as it earns strictly
positive (net) profit. Thus, we can expect an overall welfare increase unless the
welfare loss from lower innovation is too large. As shown in Figure 6,15 for the
14 In Figure 5, we actually use a suﬃcient condition. As iWHp(hspl) reaches a maximum
at F 00, it is enough to show that z = iWHD − iWHp(hspl)

F=F 00
> 0 for the whole range of
incomes.
15 In this figure,we define FL = iWLp − WLp. Then, it is enough to check that z =
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relevant range of fixed costs, viz. F ∈
£
0, F ∗p,root
¤
, and for all relevant range of
cross-country income diﬀerences, the L-country unambiguously gains from the
weak IPR when the H-country allows PI. That is, the welfare loss from lower
innovation is outweighed by the gains spelled out above.
This welfare ranking rules out (strict IPR, PI) as a SPNE in case II since
weak IPR is now a strictly dominant strategy for the L-country (similar to what
Ichino (2004) observed). Therefore, the existence of a SPNE in this case II boils
down to the best-response of the H-country when a weak IPR is implemented
in the L-country. A simple comparison of welfare levels for the relevant range
of parameters shows that the H-country gains from allowing MBD instead of
PI when the L-country implements a weak IPR regime, hence (weak IPR and
MBD) emerges as the unique SPNE policy regime.
The nature of SPNE policy choices, multiple or unique, reveals an interesting
feature: Entry deterring limit quality is never realized at the SPNE. Because,
the threat of entry deterrence makes a weak IPR regime suboptimal for the
L-country regardless of whether the H-country chooses MBD or PI, and thus
forces it to implement a stronger IPR regime whenever it is relatively profitable
for the MNC to deter entry by innovating a limit quality.
5 Discussions
In this section we discuss, first, the welfare and eﬃciency properties of the two
SPNE policy choices derived above, and second, a special case of the above policy
game where the choice of the L-government is over allowing and not allowing
compulsory licensing. We also briefly discuss how our results may change if
there is a transport cost in parallel trading that prohibits full convergence of
prices across countries.
5.1 Properties of SPNE policy choices
What appears from Proposition 1 is that the obligations of countries as members
of the WTO to implement the TRIPS has two implications. First, in the
context of multiple SPNE — (Strict IPR, PI) and (Weak IPR, MBD) — as in
Case I , TRIPS is essentially an instrument of equilibrium selection. Second,
when (Strict IPR, PI) is not a SPNE, such as in case II, TRIPS enforces policy
regimes which would not have been (non-cooperatively) chosen by the countries.
Under these circumstance, it is interesting to compare the eﬃciency and welfare
properties of (Strict IPR, PI) being enforced by the TRIPS with the other SPNE
policy choice. We make comparisons of the two SPNE policy choices in terms
of four key variables: the extent of market coverage, the level of innovation,
national welfare levels, and global welfare level (Tables 1 and 2 summarize
equilibrium quality, price and welfare levels).
First, it is readily verifiable that the MNC covers a smaller segment of the
L-country market and a larger segment of the H-country market at the (strict
F∗P,root − FL < 0.
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IPR, PI)-SPNE than at the (weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE.16 Moreover, the buyers in
the L-country even poorer than ey∗LD can also buy the drug, albeit the imitated
one, at the (weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE.
Second, recall that under MBD, the threat of imitation and ensuing
competition with the local imitator induces the MNC to innovate a lower quality.
Also, under a strict IPR, price arbitrage has similar adverse innovation eﬀect.
However, whether imitation has a stronger disincentive for innovation compared
to that of PI or not when both policies are combined depends on the cross-
country income disparity. It can be checked that, for cross-country income
diﬀerences suﬃciently large in the sense that yH > 1.8yL , innovation level is
higher at the (Weak IPR, MBD)-SPNE than under (Strict IPR, PI).
Turning to the national welfare levels, recall that we have already established
that the L-country unambiguously looses at the (strict IPR, PI)-SPNE compared
to the other SPNE (see equation (36)). For the H-country, on the other hand,
welfare increases at the WTO-compliant SPNE, i.e., fWHD < WHp. Finally, it
is possible to prove that the total or global welfare under a (strict IPR, PI)
is unambiguously lower than that under (weak IPR, MBD). Thus, the WTO-
compliant SPNE is not even globally welfare improving over the other SPNE.
These results clearly bring out the implications of enforcing the (strict IPR,
PI)-SPNE through member countries’ obligation to implement the TRIPS. More
precisely,
Proposition 2 In the above context, implementation of a strict IPR regime by
WTO commitments make the poor country unambiguously worse oﬀ in terms
of both market coverage and national welfare. The level of innovation may be
lower as well when cross country income disparity is large enough in the sense
defined above. The rich country unambiguously gains but the welfare gain is
smaller than the welfare loss suﬀered by the poor country.
To prove the above it is suﬃcient to note that when the L-country
implements strict IPR regime under WTO commitment, the H-country chooses
PI. Thus, WTO commitments enforce (Strict IPR, PI) regime regardless of
whether it is a SPNE policy regime or not.
Indeed it is also possible to prove that (weak IPR, MBD) results in the
highest level of global welfare relative to all the other possible policy regimes
(subgame perfect or not).
There is an interesting link to the empirical work of Chaudhuri et al. (2006).
In our paper, introduction of TRIPS under PI implies an increase in the price
of the MNC product being sold abroad of around 343% under price arbitrage
(this increase is consistent with Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Jia (2006)). The
introduction of TRIPS under MBD would generate a lower increase in prices.
However, even for the biggest income diﬀerence allowed in our model the price
increase would be around 278%. However, for us the most relevant price
16Simply note that yP = 14 (yL + yH) >
5
12
yL = hy∗LD and yP = 14 (yL + yH) <
1
2
yH =
hy∗HD = y∗HD .
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comparison is that between the two SPNE outcomes: (Strict IPR, PI) and
(Weak IPR, MBD). It is possible to prove that this will most likely lead to the
highest price increases.
5.2 Compulsory licensing versus parallel imports
As we have mentioned earlier, a large number of countries had allowed CL
in the pre-TRIPS era and a strong case has often been made in favour of its
continuation under the new IPR regime [Correa (2000b)]. Canada has been a
country that had successfully implemented CL during from the 1920s. More
recently, India has allowed automatic CLs for mailbox applications. In the
amendment of the Indian Patent Act of 1970 in 1999, in keeping with India’s
commitments for implementation of TRIPS with eﬀect from the year 2005, a
”mailbox facility” was created by which all applications claiming pharmaceutical
inventions would be accepted and put away in a mailbox to be examined in 2005.
By this ”mailbox facility”, applications would be judged for novelty on the basis
of filing date and not with reference to 2005. The act provides that in regard to
the ”mailbox applications” that result in the grant of patents, an automatic CLs
would be issued to those generic companies that made significant investment and
were producing and marketing a drug covered by the mailbox application prior
to 2005. Even the WTO (2002) recognizes its importance though instead of CL,
the Article 31 refers to ”use without authorization of the right holder”. It also
does not place any restrictions on the grounds under which a CL can be provided
to a local non-patentee.17 In the 1923 Patent Act of Canada, a CL allowed the
licensee the right to manufacture, use or sell a patented innovation before the
patent expires without the consent of the patent holder and in exchange the
licensee was required to pay a royalty. This royalty was then paid to the patent
holder.
Given this perspective, suppose instead of the choice over a stronger and
a weak IPR regime, the L-country has a choice over allowing or not allowing
a CL. The important diﬀerence that we now have is regarding the profit of
the local firm and consequently the welfare of the L-country. The local firm
with CL can now produce the patented drug without incurring any significant
development cost, F. But it has to pay a royalty to the local authority which is
then transferred to the patent holder. Suppose, as a benchmark case, the royalty
is a fixed sum, R, decided by the L-country government. The innovator’s net
profit under CL equals eπ∗D +R or eπ∗p +R whereas the local firm’s profit equalseπD −R or eπp −R according as the H-country does not and does allow PI. For
the L-country government, the choice now is not just over whether to provide
CL to the local firm or not, but also over the royalty amount. By Lemma 3 and
4, it is immediate that in case the L-country government provides CL, it would
set the royalty levels below Ri, i = D, p, where Ri is such that eπi = Ri. Note
that given Propositions 1 and 2 above, the L-government can ensure a higher
17 It though specifies certain conditions which include that the non-patentee must have
made eﬀorts to get a voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms, and the CL can be
terminated if and when the circumstances which led it cease to exist and are unlikely to occur.
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welfare level by setting any royalty less than F ∗p,root. However, since
∂WL
∂R < 0,
so the L-government will set R = 0. The policy game thus boils down to case
II discussed above with (CL, MBD) as the unique SPNE policy choice.
5.3 Transport Costs
Transport costs will prevent price equalization even under PI. Following the
iceberg model of transport costs, suppose a δ fraction of output is lost in transit.
Thus, per unit of the drug parallely imported δP revenue is lost. To make up
for this, the parallel exporters would charge (1+ δ)P . This enables the MNC
to charge (1 + δ)P in the H-country and P in the L-country for the innovated
drug. This will increase the MNC’s profits and innovated quality under PI. If
transport cost are high enough the PI and MBD cases would be the same.
Since entry is deterred by the innovator only under PI, and profit level of
the innovator under PI rises with the transport cost in PI and approaches to the
profit level under MBD, we can expect entry being accommodated even under
PI for a high enough transport cost. This will mean a higher welfare for the
L-country.
For consumers in the H-country two opposing eﬀects would be at work: price
decline under PI (compared to MBD) would be less but quality reduction would
be less as well. There would be a critical δ∗ for which (1+ δ∗)PDL = P
D
H . Thus,
the H-country will benefit from allowing PI only if the transport cost is not too
high: δ < δ∗.
6 Conclusion
We have examined a policy game between a low-income and a high-income
country over patent protection and international exhaustion of patent rights (or
parallel imports) of an on-patent drug. The policy choices are shown to depend
on the level of fixed cost of imitation by a local firm in the low-income country.
For a moderately high fixed cost for which entry is not blockaded but is deterred
under PI when the low-income country implements a weak IPR, both (Strict
IPR, PI) and (Weak IPR, MBD) emerge as the SPNE policy choices. In such
a context, the WTO commitment to implement a strict IPR regime appears
as a mechanism for equilibrium selection as it enforces the (Strict IPR, PI).
The low-income country, however, suﬀers a welfare loss from implementation
of such a SPNE policy regime, which is even larger than the welfare gain for
the high-income country. For relatively smaller fixed cost, (Weak IPR, MBD)
emerges as the unique SPNE policy choice, because now that the MNC always
accommodates the local imitator, it is worthwhile for the low-income country
to implement a weak IPR regardless of the policy choice of the high-income
country.
Our paper contains a number of simplifying assumptions. To obtain
closed-form solutions needed to calculate welfare levels, we have considered a
functional form for net utility which is separable in quality and price which, like
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other specific functional forms, has its own limitations. We also linearize the
correlation between income level and marginal willingness-to-pay. Our results
should hold qualitatively for any other specific form of the utility function, as
long as net utility is additively separable in quality and price, which has been
widely used in the vertical diﬀerentiation literature. In addition we assume
that production costs are zero, this is also a commonly used assumption in
the literature and it fits out model objectives as we want to focus in the firms
diﬀerent ability to innovate rather than production costs.
The way in which we model innovation aims to capture the pharmaceutical
sector. We assume that entry in the imitation sector is restricted, this follows
from our observations of the Indian pharmaceutical sector. Imitation can
happen at any level below the innovated drug’s quality but, there is an exogenous
fixed cost involved in designing an imitation and leapfrogging is not possible as
it involves a technology not available to the imitator. The robustness of our
results needs to be examined with respect to endogeneity of imitation cost,
which constitutes our future research agenda. Free entry into imitation sector
could be another area of our future research. However, as long as the quality
choice is endogenous for both quality followers as well as innovators, we do not
expect entry to be significant [see Shaked and Sutton (1982)]. An alternative
could be to assume that the imitative sector acts as a competitive fringe and
that the fixed cost of imitation is zero, however this would seem to be a better fit
for modelling the competition between branded drugs and generic competitor,
which is not what we are aiming to capture in the present paper.
References
[1] Acharyya, R., 2005, Quality discrimination among income constrained
consumers, Economics Letters, 86, 245-251.
[2] Acharyya, R. (2008a). Market coverage, price and national welfare
under international exhaustion of patents, WP 04-08, International
Trade Research Series, UNCTAD-JUECON Programme, Department of
Economics, Jadavpur University.
[3] Acharyya, R. (2008b). Income Redistribution Policy and Product
Development. India Macroeconomics Annual, p. 59-79.
[4] Acharyya, R. and Garcia-Alonso, M. D. C. (2008). Parallel imports,
innovations and national welfare: role of the sizes of the income classes
and national markets for health care, The Singapore Economic Review,
53(1): 1-23.
[5] Acharyya, R. and García-Alonso, M.D.C. (2006) Self-interested motives for
international income redistribution and access to health care innovation,
European Journal of Political Economy, 22(2): 322-336.
24
[6] Abbott, F. (2001). The TRIPS agreement, access to medicines and the
WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, Occasional Paper 7, Geneva: Quaker
United Nations Oﬃce.
[7] Chadha, A. (2005). TRIPS and patenting activity: Evidence from the
Indian pharmaceutical industry, Working Paper 0512, National University
of Singapore.
[8] Chaudhuri, S., Goldberg, P. K. and Jia, P. (2006). Estimating the eﬀects
of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals: a case study of Quinolones
in India. American Economic Review, 96(5): 1477—1514.
[9] Correa, C. M. (2000a). Integrating public health concerns into patent
legislation in developing countries, Geneva: South Centre.
[10] Correa, C. M. (2000b). Intellectual property rights, the WTO and
developing countries: the TRIPS agreement and policy options, London:
Zed Booths and Penang: Third World Network.
[11] Danzon, P.M. (1998). The economics of parallel trade, Pharmacoeconomics
13: 293-304.
[12] Donnenfeld, S., and Weber, S. (1995) Limit qualities and entry deterrence,
RAND Journal of Economics, 26(1): 113-130.
[13] Gabszewicz, J., Thisse, J.-F. (1979). Price competition, quality and income
disparities. Journal of Economic Theory 20, 340-359.
[14] Gilbert, R. and Shapiro, C. (1990). Optimal patent length and breadth,
RAND Journal of Economics, 21: 106-112.
[15] Grossman, G.M. and Lai, E. L.-C. (2008) Parallel imports and price
controls RAND Journal of Economics, 39, 2, 378-402.
[16] Ichino, Y. (2004) Parallel imports, quality diﬀerentiation and product
piracy in a North-South model, SSRN WP, November 2004.
[17] Kovac, E. and Zigic, K. (2007). International competition in vertically
diﬀerentiated markets with innovation and imitation: trade policy versus
free trade, WP 336, Center for Economic Research and Graduate
Education, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Charles University.
[18] Lall, S. (2003). Indicators of relative importance of IPRs in Developing
countries, Research Policy, 32: 1657-80.
[19] Li, C. and Maskus, K.E. (2006) The impact of parallell imports
on investment in cost-reduding research and development, Journal of
International Economics, 37, 167-196.
[20] Lutz, S. (1997). Vertical product diﬀerentiation and entry deterrence,
Journal of Economics, 65(1): 79-102.
25
[21] Malueg, D.A., and Schwartz, M. (1994). Parallel imports, demand
dispersion and international price discrimination, Journal of International
Economics 37: 167-196.
[22] Maskus, K. (2001). Parallel imports in pharmaceuticals: implications for
competition and prices in developing countries, Final Report to World
Intellectual Property Organization.
[23] Primo Braga, C. (1990) The developing country care for against intellectual
property protection”. In Wolfgang E. Siebeck (Ed.), Strengthening
Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Survey of
the Literature, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
[24] Ramani, S.V., and Maria, A. (2005). TRIPS: Its possible impact on biotech
segment of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, Economic and Political
Weekly, February, 675-683.
[25] Richardson, M. (2002). An elementary proposition concerning parallel
imports, Journal of International Economics 56: 233-45.
[26] Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1982). Relaxing price competition through
product diﬀerentiation, Review of Economic Studies 49, 3-13.
[27] Sohn, S.J. (2008). The two eﬀects of imitation, Economic Modelling, 25:
75-82.
[28] Valletti, T.M. (2006). Diﬀerential pricing, parallel imports and the incentive
to invest, Journal of International Economics 70: 314-24.
Policy regime innovated quality price in country L
strictIPR, MBD s∗D =
1
4
£
y2L + y
2
H
¤
P ∗jD =
1
2s
∗
Dyj
weakIPR, MBD es∗D = 148 £12y2H + 7y2L¤ eP ∗LD = 14es∗DyL
strictIPR, PI s∗p =
1
8 [yH + yL]
2 P ∗p =
1
4 [yH + yL] s
∗
p
weakIPR, PI
(I)DETERRENCE
es∗pl = 96F(yH+yL)2 eP ∗p (es∗pl) = 24F(yH+yL)
weakIPR, PI
(II)ACCOMMODATION
es∗p = 796 (yH + yL)2 eP ∗p (es∗p) = 7768 (yH + yL)3
Table 1: Price and quality outcomes.
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Policy regime Country H0s welfare
strictIPR, MBD WHD =
[2y2H+y
2
L](y
2
L+y
2
H)
32
weakIPR, MBD fWHD = [24y2H+7y2L](12y2H+7y2L)(48)(96)
strictIPR, PI WHp =
[11y2H+3y2L−2yHyL](yH+yL)2
256
weakIPR, PI(I) fWHp (espl) = 96F

13y2H+2yHyL+5y
2
L
32 − 108(yH+yL)2
F

(yH+yL)
2
weakIPR, PI(II) fWHp = 7[161y2H−14yHyL+17y2L](yH+yL)28(48)(96)
Table 2a: Welfare levels for country-H.
Policy regime Country L0s welfare
strictIPR, MBD WLD =
y2L[y2L+y2H]
32
weakIPR, MBD fWLD − F = 7348 [12y2H+7y2L]y2L144 − F
strictIPR, PI WLp =
[3yL−yH ]2(yH+yL)2
256
weakIPR, PI(I) fWLp (espl) = 3(3yL−yH)2(yH+yL)2 F
weakIPR, PI(II) fWLp − F = 7[9y2H−30yHyL+153y2L](yH+yL)28(48)(96) − F
Table 2b: Welfare levels for country-L.18
18Note that since under entry deterrence, the MNC charges the same (uniform) monopoly
price as when there is no threat of imitation under a stronger IPR implemented in the L-
country, so once again the L-country market will be served at all as long as 3yL > yH . Thus,
iWLp(hspl) > 0 only for the limited range of cross-country income disparity. Also note that
iWHp(hspl) is strictly positive only for F < F 0 ≡

13y2H + 2yHyL + 5y
2
L

(yH + yL)
2
(32) (108)
.
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Figure 1: Comparison of critical fixed costs ( t = yHyL , yL = 1).
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Figure 2: Entry conditions for diﬀerent entry costs.
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Cases Range of Fixed Costs
Payoff Matrix
Strategy Sets: 
L: Strict IPR, Weak IPR; H: MBD, PI
Case I
Case II
WLD, WHD WLp, WHp
HDLD WFW
~,~ − )~(~),~(~ plHpplLp sWsW
WLD, WHD WLp, WHp
HpLp WFW
~,~ −
*
,p rootF F<
Drootp FFF <<*,
HDLD WFW
~,~ −
Figure 1: Figure 3. The policy game (assuming F < FD and F ∗p,root < FD).
Figure 4: z = fWHD −fWHp, t = yHyL .
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Figure 5: fWHp(espl) reaches a maximum at F 00, z = fWHD − fWHp(espl)¯¯¯
F=F 00
,
t = yHyL .
Figure 6: t = yHyL , z = F
∗
P,root − FL, FL = fWLp −WLp.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
Since, the limit quality is monotonically increasing in F , it is suﬃcient to
show that es∗Dl ¡FD¢ = es∗D. Using (17) and (18),
es∗Dl ¡FD¢ = 148 £12y2H + 7y2L¤ = es∗D. (A.1)
On the other hand, denoting the indiﬀerent income under entry deterrence byby∗LD, we get,
by∗LD = eP lLDes∗Dl = 12yL = y∗LD. (A.2)
Hence the claim.
Proof of Lemma 4
The profit that is realized for the MNC from the entry-deterring strategy
equals eπ∗Dl = 48y2L
∙
1
4
¡
y2L + y
2
H
¢
F − 24
y2L
F 2
¸
. (A.3)
Note that eπ∗Dl = 0 for F = eFD:
eFD = 1
96
y2L
¡
y2L + y
2
H
¢
. (A.4)
Also note that eπ∗Dl reaches a maximum for F = bFD = 1192 ¡y2L + y2H¢ y2L =
1
2
eFD. Also note that bFD > FD = y2L
192
£
y2H +
7
12y
2
L
¤
. It follows that eFD > bFD >
FD. Therefore, eπ∗Dl is monotonically increasing in F in the relevant range, i.e.,
for all F < FD. On the other hand, the maximum profit of the MNC under
entry-deterring strategy equals,
eπ∗Dl ³ bFD´ = 132 ¡y2L + y2H¢ . (A.5)
Let F ∗D be such that eπ∗D = eπ∗Dl (F ∗D) . Recalling the profit levels under the entry
accommodating and deterring strategies, we get
1152
y4L
F ∗
2
D −
12
¡
y2L + y
2
H
¢
y2L
F ∗D −
1
8
∙
y2H +
7
12
y2L
¸2
= 0, (A.6)
which solves for the two roots as:
F ∗D,root =
y2L
192
⎡
⎣¡y2L + y2H¢±
s¡
y2L + y
2
H
¢2 − ∙y2H + 712y2L
¸2⎤
⎦ . (A.7)
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It can be checked that the smaller root is higher than FD. Hence, it is not
worthwhile for the MNC to deter entry for all F < FD.
Proof of Lemma 5
It is readily verifiable that the MNC’s profit under the entry-deterring
strategy
eπ∗pl = 12F − (96)2
2 (yH + yL)
4F
2. (A.8)
is U shaped and monotonically increasing in the relevant range of fixed cost
of imitation by the local firm, viz. for all F ≤ F p.
∂eπ∗pl
∂F
> 0 ∀ F < bFp = (yH + yL)4
16 (48)
. (A.9)
But, bFp > F p, which can be checked by recalling the value of F p from (27)
in the text:
bFp − F p = (yH + yL)4
16 (48)
− 7
4 (48)2
(yH + yL)
4 > 0. (A.10)
Thus,
∂eπ∗pl
∂F
> 0 ∀ F < F p. Moreover, eπ∗pl(F p) = 144
2 (96)
2 (yH + yL)
4 > eπ∗p >eπ∗pl(0). Hence, as long as eπ∗pl(F ) is continuous, the are two values of F such thateπ∗pl(F ∗p,root) = eπ∗p. But, only the smaller root is smaller than F p. From (A.8)
and (26), we obtain the equation that defines such value:
F ∗p,root =
"
12−
√
95
4 (48)2
#
(yH + yL)
4 . (A.11)
Hence, for the relevant range of fixed costs, viz., F ≤ F p, only the smaller
root of F ∗P is relevant such that given (A.9), eπ∗pl(F ) > eπ∗p ∀ F ∈ ¡F ∗P,root, F p¤.
It can also be verified that F ∗p,root < F p and FD < FP .
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